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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
RAINER F. HUCK, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
PATRICIA ANN HUCK, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Case No. 19180 
This is a divorce action between Plaintiff and Defendant 
in which the parties originally asked for a judicial deter-
mination regarding property rights, alimony, child support, 
and child custody. The sole issues on appeal, however, concern 
the property distribution, award of temporary alimony, and 
attorneys' fees. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The original Complaint was filed by Plaintiff against 
Defendant in April of 1979. The court file will reflect 
numerous events which occurred from that time until the filing 
of this appeal. These events included a dispute as to which 
party should live in the residence, an effort by Defendant to 
disqualify Plaintiff's attorney, several hearings concerning 
child support and custody, two pre-trial efforts to sesregate 
property before trial, and finally, a two-day trial before th~ 
Honorable James S. Sawaya involving some ten witnesses and 
numerous exhibits. 
The lower court rendered a Memorandum Decision in April of 
1981. (R. 397-398). The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law in accordance with the decision were entered in June of 
1982. In April of 1983 Plaintiff's Motion to Alter or Amend 
the Findings was denied. 
Plaintiff now appeals from the judgment entered against 
him and the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in support 
thereof. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff-Appellant seeks reversal of the lower court's 
judgment in the following particulars: vacation of any award 
for temporary alimony, vacation of any award for temporary 
attorneys' fees, and modification of the property distribution. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The present appeal before this Court is truly unique. 
After reviewing numerous divorce actions decided by this Court 
it is not an exaggeration to say that the present case involves 
elements, both factual and legal, which have never been pre-
viously litigated. The attorneys for both parties, together 
with the lower court judges, all have acknowledged the diffi-
culty in solving and dealing with the unique facts in this 
case and the unusual legal issues involved. 
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For this reason, Appellant will attempt to eliminate those 
facts which are not related to issues relevant to this appeal. 
For example, while the question of child custody, visitation, 
and child support were hotly contested in the lower court, 
Appellant believes that the lower court did not abuse its 
discretion in making these awards. Therefore, even though 
Appellant feels strongly about the child related issues, the 
evidence relating to these issues will not be discussed herein. 
The heart of this appeal concerns the validity of a pre-
nuptial agreement, the circumstances surrounding the marriage 
and the acquisition of certain real estate by Plaintiff, and the 
ability of Defendant to support herself after the separation of 
the parties and during the pendency of the divorce. Thus, a 
history of the marriage of the parties, their relationship 
during the marriage, and the financial ability of each party 
after separation are all relevant to this appeal. 
Appellant recognizes that this Court has the power under 
the Utah Constitution to completely review all of the evidence 
de novo in spite of the lower court's findings. However, Appellant 
is also aware that this Court will defer to the lower court's 
decision unless there is clear abuse or misapplication of the 
law. Stone v. Stone, 431 P. 2d 802 (Utah 1967). For this reason, 
and for the convenience of the court, Plaintiff shall state 
these facts most favorably to the defendant-wife. When there 
is a factual dispute in which the court's decision is subject 
to dispute, Appellant shall state such contrary evidence in 
brackets. It is hoped that by using this method this Court will 
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be able to quickly review all of the evidence that was availablE 
to the lower court in making its decision and will be able to 
determine quickly whether the lower court ignored substantial 
evidence in support of the arguments raised by Plaintiff. 
EVENTS PRIOR TO MARRIAGE RELATING TO PLAINTIFF 
Plaintiff Rainer Huck (hereinafter Rainer) entered the 
University of Utah in 1964 and obtained a B.S. degree in 1968. 
(Tr. 441). In 1968 he entered a graduate program in electrical 
engineering. By 1971 he had completed most of his classwork 
and was working on a dissertation entitled "Critical Re-examina-
tion of the Special Theory of Relativity." (Tr. 443). 
This thesis was submitted by the engineering department to 
the physics department for its corrunents. The ohysics depart-
ment rejected the theory proffered by Mr. Huck and rejected 
the paper. (Tr. 445). 
Nevertheless, Mr. Huck believed that the theory known as 
the "Reciprocal System Theory" had great scientific promise 
and felt that it was worthy of a lifetime career goal. He 
knew, however, based upon his experience with the physics 
department that it would be very difficult for him to obtain 
any funding to do this type of work through conventional sources 
He therefore decided to endeavor to establish an independent 
fund for himself so that he could continue his research inde-
pendently. (Tr. 445-446). 
In 1974 Mr. Huck obtained his Ph.D. degree from the 
University of Utah in electrical engineering by subm1ttino a 
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completely unrelated dissertation to the one previously rejected 
by the physics department. 
In 1971 he purchased his own home at 1195 South Windsor 
Street. He purchased the home with his own funds and from money 
lent to him by his father. (Tr. 443). 
In 1972, as part of his plan to develop rental properties, 
he purchased another property at Lindon Avenue. This property 
was jointly owned between Mr. Huck and his close personal 
friend, Craig S. Cook, who was his trial counsel and is now 
his appellate counsel. (Tr. 448). Prior to his marriage he 
purchased the following additional houses for rental property: 
923 South 4th East (jointly with Mr. Cook); 837 Menlow Avenue 
(jointly with Mr. Cook); 1161 Bueno Avenue (jointly with Mr. 
Cook); 227-229 Iowa Street (jointly with Mr. Cook); 334 Stanton 
Avenue, 633 Grand Street; 1127 Milton Avenue. 
During this period of time Mr. Huck was continually reading 
and researching concerning the scientific theory he wished to 
advance but was also putting in a great deal of time with the 
rental properties. He was instrumental in founding the 
"New Science Advocates" which was an organization dedicated to 
the study and evaluation of the Reciprocal System. He became 
treasurer of that organization. (Tr. 473). 
PRE-MARITAL RELATION OF THE PARTIES 
In 1972 he met his future wife Patricia Huck (hereinafter 
Pat) at a party given by Stan Secor. Throughout 1973 and 1974 
he began dating her more frequently perhaps two or three times 
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a week. At that time Pat was working in the rh.n. EcHJ<!Lam 11"1 
biology and had been there since 1970. (Tr. 448-4-19). 
As they continued to date there were substantial problems 
and personality differences causing a lot of arguments. (Tr. 
450). During the latter part of 1974 the parties had a discuss. 
in which Pat said she was leaving Salt Lake when she completed 
her Ph.D. degree which would be in about six months. They 
agreed that they would continue dating until that time. (Tr. 
453, 662). For the two years they had been dating the parties 
had had a sexual relationship and Pat had used contraception 
to prevent pregnancy. Shortly after the conversation in the 
middle of December, however, she became pregnant. (Tr. 663). 
In 1975 Rainer was 28 and had never been married. 
33 and was a widow from a prior marriage. (Tr. 348). 
Pat was 
In 
January of 1975 Pat informed Rainer that she was pregnant. 
At that point in time marriage was discussed in great detail 
but Rainer felt the problems were still inevitable and that a 
marriage would not be advisable. (Tr. 454). As stated by Pat, 
Rainer did not want to marry her. (Tr. 663). 
Pat went to Rainer's parents and told them about the situa-
tion. She asked them to try to convince Rainer to marry her. 
(Tr. 455). She stated she thought that his mother would like t: 
have grandchildren and would encourage the marriage. !Tr. 66J 
A great deal of discussion occurred during the early month.· 
of 1975 as to the alternatives which were available. Fainer 
suggested that Pat obtain an abortion since h~ diJ not bel1e~e 
that a child should be brought into a situation ~here t~e ~art1e 
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were doomed to be unhappy. (Tr. 454, 613). Pat did not want 
an abortion and was happy to be pregnant. She told Rainer that 
she wanted to have a child and intended on having a child. 
(Tr. 613) . 
[Rainer testified that Pat repeatedly told him that if he 
did not marry her she was going to commit suicide. She began 
leaving her valuable possessions on his doorstep on a daily 
basis saying that she would not need them any more. (Tr. 455). 
Pat denied ever threatening suicide or ever leaving possessions 
on his doorstep. (Tr. 663)]. 
THE SIGNING OF THE PRE-MARITAL AGREEMENT 
Sometime in February or early March of 1975 Rainer agreed 
to marry her. He told her, however, that under these circum-
stances he thought they should have a prenuptial agreement. 
(Tr. 457). [Mr. Huck contended that he informed her of this 
pre-nuptial agreement almost a month before the marriage. (Tr. 
457) .] Mrs. Huck contended that she was not given the document 
until three or four days prior to the marriage. (Tr. 614) 
The pre-nuptial agreement was prepared by Mr. Huck's 
attorney, Craig Cook. He asked her to take it to her attorney, 
Wally Sandack, so that he could examine it, counsel her, and 
execute his signature. Mr. Sandack advised her not to sign 
the document nor to marry Mr. Huck. He refused to sign the 
document himself. (Tr. 458; 615). 
She returned the document to Rainer at which time he had 
it modified so as not to require any signature of either counsel. 
(Tr. 459). 
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Each party listed the assets which they were bringing 
into the marriage. A list of all the properties previously 
acquired by Rainer was attached to the prenuptial agreement 
including an additional notation of "cash and personal 
property" worth $15,000. It is stated in paragraph 2 that Pat 
brought into the marriage property worth approximately $1,000. 
[Mr. Huck testified that Pat supplied this $1,000 figure. (Tr. 
461) . ] Pat testified that this figure was inserted by her 
husband and Mr. Cook and that since she believed she did not 
have adequate counsel they could go ahead and put in anything 
they wanted to. (Tr. 665). 
The prenuptial agreement was signed on April 9, 1975 before 
a notary public. This was one day prior to the marriage which 
interestingly enough was performed by Judge Sawaya who also 
presided over the divorce trial. 
EVENTS DURING THE MARRIAGE 
Sophie Huck was born on September 21, 1975. (Tr. 467). 
While this issue was contested below, for purposes of this 
appeal it will be assumed that Pat Huck performed the necessary 
duties as a housewife and mother. It should also be noted that 
from the time of the marriage up until July of 1978 Pat was 
actively pursuing her attempt to obtain a Ph,D. degree. As 
part of this program she was appointed a teaching assistant 
and taught every other quarter. She received a tax-free stipend 
of $375 a month during this period. (Tr. 615-616). Except for 
an additional $40 a month she received from a California invest-
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ment, her sole independent income was limited to the govern-
mental stipend. (Tr. 625; R. 113). 
Rainer obtained the majority of his income from the rental 
houses which he had purchased prior to the marriage. (Tr. 475). 
He spent substantial time fixing up and dealing with the rentals. 
(Tr. 636). 
Rainer testified that within the first week or two of the 
marriage the two parties had a conversation regarding property 
and finance. Pat said she wanted to keep her money separate 
and that he should likewise keep his separate. She wanted to 
divide the costs of living as equally as possible. (Tr. 464). 
He testified that he did not feel this was a good way to run a 
marriage but that if she wanted to do it that way there was no 
other alternative. (Tr. 465). Pat admitted that she felt hostile 
during the early part of the marriage because of a number of things 
including the prenuptial agreement. (Tr. 666). 
The evidence shows that Pat maintained her maiden name at 
the University of Utah. Under this unusual marriage arrangement 
each party maintained their own separate checking and savings 
accounts. All rental money he received went strictly into his 
account. All money that she received from the University went 
into her account. (Tr. 471). 
Under the agreement Rainer was to provide the house and 
pay the taxes and utilities with the exception of the electric 
bill which Pat agreed to pay. She agreed to pay the majority 
of the food, to maintain medical insurance on the family, and 
to provide the costs of her own automobile. (Tr. 472, 619). 
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In addition, she paid for the hospital and doctor costs involveo 
with the birth of her daughter and for any babysittu1q fees. 
(Tr. 616-617). [Rainer testified that it was Pat's position 
that she did not want him to have anything to do with either 
the child or the expenses with respect to the child as was 
expressed in paragraph 4 of the prenuptial agreement. (Tr. 544) 
The question of Pat's involvement in the marriage with the 
rental properties will be discussed in the legal argument con-
cerning estoppel. Appellant believes that there was oven.,,helmir.: 
evidence that she expressed repeatedly her desire to have no 
interest in any acquired properties and, in fact, refused to 
assist him in any way in this venture. More importantly, however 
Appellant shall state facts which show that he relied upon 
her representations during the course of the marriage on the 
mistaken belief that by assisting her and the child during her 
education she would make no claim against any betterment he may 
have made in the acquisition of new properties. 
During the first year of the marriage, 1975, additional 
properties were acquired by Rainer. A property located at 
629 Harmony Court was purchased on June 9, 1975. $3,000 was 
put down to acquire that house and the money was withdrawn 
from Rainer's savings account of premarital funds. 
Ex. 5). 
(Tr. 507; 
In August of 1975 a duplex was purchased at 942-46 Harvar~ 
Avenue. The down payment for this ~roperty also came from 
Plaintiff's premarital funds which were withdrawn from a savincs 
account. (Ex. 5 , Ex . 6) . 
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In 1976 an additional house was jointly purchased with 
Craig Cook utilizing premarital funds as Plaintiff's share of 
the down payment. This house was located at 860 Parkway Avenue. 
(R. 94, Ex. 5, Ex. 6). In addition, Plaintiff purchased two 
other houses in 1976 with money obtained from the rental income 
of the other properties. These houses were located at 215 Iowa 
Street and 848 Green Street (which was again purchased with 
Mr. Cook). (R. 93-94; Tr. 520). 
In 1977 three additional properties were purchased. In 
September of 1977 a house at 653 Egli Court was purchased 
jointly with Mr. Cook. The money used by Rainer as his portion 
of the down payment was also withdrawn from his savings account 
which contained premarital funds. (Ex. 5, Ex. 6, Ex. 32). 
During that same month a property located at 224 Iowa 
Street was purchased jointly with defendant Pat Huck. His 
share of the down payment was obtained on a loan from his father, 
Herman Huck. (Tr. 521; Ex. 5). Her share was obtained from an 
investment she sold in California. (Tr. 672-673). As will be 
discussed infra, while all of the other properties were solely 
in the name of Rainer Huck, the 224 Iowa Street property was in 
the names of both Rainer Huck and Patricia Huck, as tenants in 
common. (Ex. 5). 
The final house that was acquired during the marriage was 
located at 639 Grand Street and was purchased in December of 1977. 
The money for this house was financed entirely by Plaintiff's 
father who received a mortgage and a note. (Tr. 509-510). 
Once these houses were obtained they were all self-sustaining 
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in that they provided sufficient income to pay any encumbrances 
and expenses. (Tr. 509, 519). 
In 1975 Mr. Huck added a garage to the back of the Wi~dsor 
Street property with money lent to him by his father. (TL 466! 
In the summer of 1976 Mr. Huck and his father began building an 
addition to the Windsor Street property. The actual labor for 
the addition was performed by Mr. Huck, his father, and a few 
contractors. Approximately $12,000 was spent on the addition 
excluding the labor of Mr. Huck and his father. This money 
was with drawn from Mr. Huck's separate account where the majority 
was funded by premarital rental properties. (Tr. 599-601, Ex. 
13). Pat believed that all of the money for this addition came 
from Rainer's father. She did not contribute her separate funds 
for the project. (Tr. 680). 
In 1977 Rainer testified that he experienced a frequent 
wave of telephone calls in which when he answered the caller 
would hang up. The relationship in 1977 was not good. The 
parties were not getting along very well and were living fairly 
separate existences. (Tr. 480). In the early part of 1978 
because of these persistent telephone calls Mr. Huck fabricated 
a machine which would record all incoming and outgoing telephone 
calls in the Huck household automatically. The device was kept 
in Mr. Huck's electronic lab on the main floor of the house. 
(Tr. 483-485). 
During cross-examination of Pat several of these conver-
sations with Stan Secor were read into the record. 
660) . One particular conversation which occurred in April of 
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1978 will be discussed infra as to Plaintiff's claim of estoppel. 
In July of 1978 Pat took her qualifying Ph.D. exams and 
failed them. She was subsequently terminated from the Ph.D. 
program. (Tr. 490). In July of 1978 she began working full 
time at the University of Utah Blood Bank. (Tr. 494-495). 
Her gross monthly salary at the University of Utah at that time 
was $1,080. (R. 113). 
Prior to Pat's failure of the examination and her employ-
ment with the University of Utah Hospital she retained attorney 
A. Wally Sandack to represent her in a divorce proceeding. On 
April 21, 1978 a letter was sent to Rainer advising him that 
his wife was planning on commencing a divorce proceeding and 
requesting that he be permitted to discuss financial matters, 
disposition of property and other items with Mr. Huck's attorney. 
(Plaintiff's Ex. 3). Rainer and Mr. Cook went to Mr. Sandack's 
off ice for the meeting and were informed that he wanted to know 
exactly what assets Mr. Huck had including his present income. 
(Tr. 489). 
Pat Huck testified that the only reason she went to Sandack 
in 1978 was to see if he could persuade Rainer to seek counseling. 
According to Pat, Sandack's idea was that since it was obvious 
her husband was so concerned with financial matters that by 
making it appear that the divorce was going to cost him more than 
keeping her around that maybe he would reconsider counseling. 
(Tr. 686-687). [Rainer testified that Pat stated to him that 
she was going to sue for divorce but that later after the letter 
was sent she stated she acted too hastily and wanted to wait for 
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the divorce until her exams had been taken. He aqreed to wait 
until the summer of 1978 in order to allow her to study.] 
In the summer of 1978 Pat seemed very distraught by the out-
come of the exams and therefore Rainer did not wish to add to 
her problems by talking about a divorce. (Tr. 488-490). 
In October of 1978 Pat was diagnosed as having cancer 
in one breast which required surgery. Her cancer was found 
to be non-evasive and she recovered quite rapidly. (Tr. 491) 
EVENTS OCCURRING AFTER FILING OF DIVORCE 
On April 23, 1979 Rainer initiated this divorce action. 
(R. 2-4). At the same time Rainer requested that he be awarded 
possession of the house during the pendency of the divorce. 
(R. 5-6). 
A hearing was held on May 3, 1979 before the Honorable 
Homer Wilkinson. Defendant's attorney requested that Rainer 
be ordered to leave the house and allow Pat to remain there. 
(Tr. 841). Judge Homer Wilkinson awarded possession of the 
Windsor Street house to Rainer. He also awarded $250 per month 
for the use of the defendant during the pendency of the action. 
(Tr. 853-857; R. 27-28). 
Subsequently on October 15, 1979, a hearing was held before 
the Honorable Christine Durham. While the hearing centered 
around visitation of the minor child, the court also allocated 
the $250 which had previously been ordered by Judge \'ilkinson 
with $175 as child support and $75 for temporary alimony. The 
court noted that whether this alimony amount would be credited 
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to Mr. Huck would depend upon whether the prenuptial agreement 
was held valid and binding and whether it would have a retro-
active effect to the pending action. (Tr. 829-830) . Judge 
Durham refused to award attorneys' fees to either party since 
both of the parties were employed and earning income. (Tr. 
832; R. 133-134). 
Subsequently, a motion was filed by Defendant to disqualify 
Plaintiff's attorney Craig S. Cook from representing him in the 
lower court. Depositions of Mr. Cook and Rainer were taken by 
Defendant's counsel. The question was submitted to the Honorable 
Kenneth Rigtrup. Concurrently, Defendant requested that she be 
allowed to change her residence to California on the basis that 
her family resided there and that she had substantial career 
opportunity available in Los Angeles. (R. 179-180). 
On June 24, 1980 Judge Rigtrup granted Defendant's motion 
to change residence and denied Defendant's motion to disqualify 
counsel. In addition, he entered an extensive pretrial order 
as to the issues remaining to be decided at trial. (R. 261-265). 
The court ordered that all property acquired prior to the marriage 
would be awarded to Rainer and would not be subject to division 
as a marital asset of the marriage with the exception of the 
1195 Windsor Street residence which would be at issue because of 
the improvements. The court ordered that the parties provide 
each other with information regarding those properties which 
were acquired after the marriage. 
Subsequently, on June 24, 1980 Judge Rigtrup awarded 
Plaintiff $250 attorneys' fees for his efforts in opposing the 
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efforts of Defendant to disqualify his attorney. ITr. 326). 
The trial was commenced on September 5, 1980 before Judge 
James S. Sawaya . A full day of testimony was taken. The trial 
was reconvened on December 19, 1980 before Judge Sawaya. Dur1n:: 
the trial Pat submitted an exhibit showing her gross monthly 
income from salary and wages to be $1,505. This was based upon 
a thirty hour work week. (Ex. 16; Tr. 625). In comparison, 
Rainer testified that his gross income during this same period 
of time was $14, 300. (Tr. 791; Ex. 30). 
Subsequent to the trial memoranda were filed by both 
parties in support of their respective positions. (R. 364-396; 
399-409). On April 22, 1981 the lower court issued a Memorandum 
Decision awarding Pat Huck 224 Iowa Street (the property held 
jointly with Rainer Huck); 629 Harmony Court; and 215 Iowa Street. 
She was also awarded $3,000 as attorneys' fees. (R. 397-398). 
On June 17, 1982 the lower court executed Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law in accordance with the Memorandum Opinion 
but which also contained additional awards. (R. 410-417). While 
the court denied Defendant's claim for alimony, the court found 
"defendant was in need of temporary alimony and support and 
continues to need said temporary alimony and support until the 
real properties and any incomes derived therefrom have been 
delivered and transferred to her as of the date of this Court's 
Memorandum Decision in April of 1981." ( R. 413) . 
The court further found that Defendant was coerced into 
executing the prenuptial agreei,1ent dated April 9, 197') "1ci that 
she was already pregnant and had made arrangements for her 
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marriage prior to being requested to executed said document." 
The court noted that Plaintiff had not been prejudiced by the 
finding of the court concerning the invalidity of the prenuptial 
agreement. 
On June 28, 1982 a Motion to Alter or Amend the Findings 
was filed by Plaintiff. (R. 423-425). 
A hearing was held on April 7, 1983 at which time the lower 
court denied Plaintiff's motion to amend the decree. (R. 430). 
This appeal was filed on May 4, 1983. (R. 4 ) • 
ARGUMENT 
A review of the file in the district court shows that 
many issues were raised by both parties throughout the pro-
ceedings. While plaintiff Rainer Huck does not necessarily 
agree with some of the other rulings made by the various district 
judges, he believes that these decisions were within the reason-
able discretion of the judges and therefore does not contest them. 
However, Plaintiff does contest three specific decisions 
made by the lower court concerning the following areas: (1) 
the finding that the prenuptial agreement was invalid thereby 
allowing the imposition of temporary alimony in favor of Pat; 
(2) the award of attorneys' fees in favor of Pat in spite of 
the failure of Pat to produce any evidence that she was unable 
to pay her own fees; and (3) the distribution to Pat of the 
houses located at 629 Harmony Street and 215 Iowa Street since 
the funds of Plaintiff used to purchase one house were pre-marital 
and Pat by her conduct throughout the marriage is equitably 
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estopped from now asserting any claim in these houses. 
These arguments will now be discussed. 
POINT I. 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN INVALIDATING 
THE PRENUPTIAL AGREEMENT AND IN AWARDING 
TEMPORARY ALIMONY TO PAT. 
The lower court in its Findings of Fact stated the 
following: 
9. The Court finds the defendant was coerced 
into executing the prenuptial agreement dated April 
9, 1975 in that she was already pregnant and had 
made arrangements for her marriage prior to being 
requested to execute said document. The court 
further finds that in either case, the plaintiff 
has not been prejudiced by a finding of this Court 
concerning the invalidity of said prenuptial 
agreement and that each and every aspect in the 
prenuptial agreement has been met and plaintiff 
has received remuneration for property brought 
into the marriage and defendant was in need of 
alimony and support for the benefit of herself 
and her minor child during the course of this 
action. 
In its Conclusions of Law the court stated: 
The court concludes that the prenuptial agree-
ment, dated April 9, 1975 should be void and of no 
effect against the defendant. However, in making 
this conclusion, it is recognized by the court that 
the plaintiff is not and has not been prejudiced by 
such a finding. (R. 414, 417). 
The Findings of the court are in error. First, there is 
no reason that the prenuptial agreement between the parties 
should be considered void. Second, the failure to honor the 
prenuptial agreemenl has indeed prejudiced ~r. Huck. 
Even if it is assumed that the testimony of Pat is 
correct as to the circumstances surroundino the prenuptial 
agreement there is still no basis for voidino it .. 'lrs. Huck 
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stated that the substance of the premarital agreement was 
presented several days before they were married. Four days 
at the most. She admitted that she sought legal counsel with 
respect to the document but that Mr. Sandack said he would not 
personally sign the agreement nor would he advise her to marry 
Rainer. Nevertheless, she then took it back to Rainer who had 
it modified so that it would not require the attorneys' signa-
tures. (Tr. 614-615). 
At the time the premarital agreement was presented, according 
to Pat, arrangements for the wedding had been made. Her parents 
were coming in from California and the printed invitations had 
been sent out. She stated that nobody knew she was pregnant 
except her husband and his parents. (Tr. 615). She testified 
on cross-examination that Rainer would not have married her 
had she not signed the agreement. She stated it almost kept 
her from marrying him since she was very disappointed and insulted 
that he would require her to sign it. (Tr. 666). She admitted 
further that the prenuptial agreement specifically waived all 
alimony. (Tr. 685) . 
There is no question that Rainer did not want to enter 
into this marriage. He did not believe the prospects of a 
successful marriage were good nor did he feel that a child 
should be brought into this type of situation. For many weeks 
he told her he did not think it wise to get married. (Tr. 454) 
He also verified that he would not have married her unless she 
agreed to sign the prenuptial agreement. (Tr. 540). 
The prenuptial agreement was signed on April 9, 1975, one 
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day before the marriage took place. It was si~ned before a 
notary public. 
The finding that the prenuptial agreement was void because 
of coercion by Mr. Huck is both factually and legally in error 
While it is certainly true that Pat was pressured into signing 
the prenuptial agreement before Rainer would agree to marry her, 
it is equally true that Rainer was pressured by Pat to enter in~ 
a marriage in the first place. In other words, there was pres-
sure from both parties against each other and if the prenuptial 
agreement is void becuase of coercion then the marriage itself 
should also be void. 
The finding by the lower court is even contrary to the 
statements made by the court during the trial. The court in 
discussing the argument that Pat was coerced into signing the 
prenuptial agreement stated: 
They are both over 21, I take it when they got 
married or at least of legal age and certainly entered 
into this agreement or this marriage and agreement 
with their eyes open, obviously. (R. 452). 
Even Defendant's counsel did not seriously oppose the 
validity of the prenuptial agreement during trial. During 
examination of Rainer by his counsel as to the circumstances 
surrounding the prenuptial agreement Mr. Sandack objected to 
that line of questioning and stated: 
Again, the prenuptial agreement is in. We agree 
that it may be valid. I don't see any necessity of 
going on with this any further. (Tr. 459). See also, 
Tr. 450-451. 
While there are no Gcah cases directly on point, prenupt1J-
or antenuptial agreements entered into by two competent parties 
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are valid and enforceable and, in fact, favored by law. 
Clark, Law of Domestic Relations, §1.9, p. 27). 
The prenuptial agreement entered into in this case (Ex. 1) 
is a legally binding contract between the two parties. At the 
time the contract was entered into Pat Huck was 33 years old 
and Rainer 28 years old. Both had consulted their attorneys 
prior to executing their signature and, in fact, Pat's attorney 
advised her against signing it. The standard for voiding a 
prenuptial agreement is no different than any other contract. 
In order to show legal coercion, the evidence must be clear, 
precise, and indubitable and must be shwon with clear and con-
vincing evidence. Kelley v. Salt Lake Transportation Co., 
116 P.2d 383 (Utah 1941); In re Swan Estate v. Walker Bank & 
Trust Co., 293 P.2d 682 (Utah 1956). 
The Colorado Court of Appeals in Matter of Estate of Lewin, 
595 P.2d 1055 (Colo. App. 1979) upheld the validity of a pre-
nuptial agreement after one of the parties was deceased and 
after it was being attacked by the surviving spouse. In that 
case the surviving wife argued that an antenuptial agreement 
was invalid since her husband failed to list all of his assets 
in the document and that she was prevented from retaining 
outside counsel. The Colorado Appellate Court held that 
neither a listing of assets of the husband nor independent 
counsel was necessary to validate a prenuptial agreement. 
of course, Rainer both listed his premarital assets in the 
agreement itself and Pat was counseled by her own attorney 
before electing to sign it.) 
-21-
(Here, 
The court stated, "The primary imquiry is •.-Jhether the 
parties entered into the agreement with full knowledge of it 
consequences." Id. at 1058. 
The lower court's finding that because invitations had 
been sent out and because the wedding had been planned is 
legally insufficient to amount to "coercion" to invalidate a 
written agreement. The evidence is crystal clear that even 
assuming that Pat had only four days to review the documents 
(as opposed to Mr. Huck's testimony that she had over thirty 
days) that there was ample time for her to knowingly make a 
decision whether to sign the document. The fact that she went 
to her attorney who specifically advised her against it but 
nonetheless signed it anyway shows that she knowingly and 
consciously executed the document on her own free will. 
Since the prenuptial agreement in this case was clearly 
valid it next remains to determine whether Mr. Huck was prejudic' 
by a finding of its invalidity. Paragraph 6 of the prenuptial 
agreement states: 
In the event of divorce or separation, Pat 
specifically waives any alimony or separate main-
tenance support provided that she is capable of 
self support at such time. (Ex. 1). 
In the May 3, 1979 hearing before the Honorable Homer 
Wilkinson the court ordered that Rainer pay to Pat $250 for 
the use of her and the child during the pendency of the action. 
(Tr. 853-857). 
On October 15, 1979 the Honorable Christine Durham allo-
cated this amount with $175 going as child succort and 575 
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going for alimony. Judge Durham noted that whether Rainer 
should receive a credit for the temporary alimony paid to Pat 
would depend on whether at trial the prenuptial agreement was 
found to be valid and binding and whether it would have a 
retroactive effect. (Tr. 830). 
Rainer paid Pat $75 from May of 1979 through May of 1981 
specifically as temporary alimony. This amount of $1,800 was 
never credited to him in the judgment of the court. Thus, he 
sustained $1,800 of "prejudice" by the finding of the invalidity 
of the prenuptial agreement. 
Pat argues that in any event she was not capable of self 
support at the time and therefore even if the prenuptial 
agreement was valid the waiver of alimony did not apply. This 
argument again flies against the evidence. In the summer of 
1979, when Pat separated from Rainer, her total gross income 
was $1,140 a month. This did not include the $250 which was 
being paid to her by Rainer under the court's order. Thus, 
her total gross was $1, 390. (R. 113). In 1980 after moving 
to California her gross income including her salary at the 
University of California Hospital (32 hours a week) plus her 
contract payment, and her child support and temporary alimony 
award amounted to $1,795. (Ex. 16, Tr. 707). 
The trial court should have objectively viewed whether 
Pat was capable of "self support" and her self serving state-
rnen ts that she could not have provided for herself without the 
additional $75 alimony should have been completely discarded. 
(Tr. 702, 628). 
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Certainly, a gross income of $1,700 a month qualifies a 
person as self-supporting. The fact that she chose to only 
work 32 hours a week and is living on Balboa Island in a beach 
house at $650 a month (Tr. 707) does not detract from this 
conclusion. It is elementary that a person's expenses are 
unlimited depending upon the style of living they wish to 
invoke. 
The lower court specifically awarded no permanent alimony 
to Pat finding that she was currently employed and capable of 
providing for her own support. (R. 412). This conclusion by 
itself further supports Mr. Huck's contention that the evidence 
is undisputed that during the entire time of the separation 
Pat was capable of self support and therefore the provisions 
of the prenuptial agreement did not obstruct the waiver to 
which she had previously agreed. A credit for $1,800 should 
therefore be awarded to Rainer. 
In addition, since the court chose to ignore the prenuptial 
agreement it is possible that the court considered Rainer's 
Windsor Street residence as an asset of the marriage which was 
subject to division. Since the court did not describe the 
division process of property, this case should be remanded (in 
the event Point III is rejected by this Court) to determine if 
the division of property was wrongfully decided. 
POINT II. 
THE LOWER COURT ABUSED ITS uISCRETION 
IN AWARDING $2,750 TO DEFENDANT AS 
ATTORNEYS' FEES. 
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In its Findings of Fact the Court stated, "The Court 
finds that Defendant was required to retain the services of 
an attorney not only to defend the action brought by Plaintiff, 
but to prosecute her own counterclaim." (R. 414, Finding No. 10). 
In the Conclusion of Law the Court stated, "That the 
plaintiff should be ordered to pay to Defendant for the use 
and benefit of her attorneys the net sum of $2,750 plus costs, 
all prior awards for temporary attorneys' fees from or to 
Defendant being merged herein." (R. 417, Conclusion No. 9) 
The record is barren as to any reason why Plaintiff should 
pay attorneys' fees incurred by his former wife. The only 
testimony concerning attorneys' fees was offered by Pat and 
by her attorney. She stated she was forced to obtain the ser-
vices of Mr. Sandack who was charging $50 or $60 an hour which 
she believed was fair and reasonable. She also stated that 
he had incurred in excess of 150 hours which she also felt was 
reasonable. (Tr. 637). 
Mr. Sandack took the stand and stated that he expended 
150 hours in the case and believed that $60 per hour was 
reasonable. Mr. Sandack admitted on cross examination that 
approximately 35 hours of this time involved an attempt to 
evict Mr. Huck from his house on Windsor Street which was 
reJected by the lower court. (Tr. 736-737). 
Except for the above cited evidence, there was no other 
testimony or exhibits offered in support of an attorneys' fee 
award. It was Defendant's burden to prove that she was unable 
to pay for her own attorneys' fees and that it was therefore 
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necessary to place her obligation upon Painer. As stated by 
the Court of Appeals in Washington: 
In determining whether attorneys' fees should 
be awarded, the needs of the requesting party should 
be balanced against the other party's ability to pay. 
In considering the record before us, we find that the 
wife has not shown an inability to pay. In re 
Marriage of Young, 569 P.2d 70 (Wash. App~7). 
This Court has established a similar standard. In Adams 
v. Adams, 593 P.2d 147 (Utah 1979) this Court upheld the denial 
of attorneys' fees to a wife who was "working and earning money" 
and where the record "does not disclose any necessity on the pa~ 
of plaintiff for such an award or her inability to pay her own 
attorneys' fees." Id. at 149. 
In Kerr v. Kerr, 610 P.2d 1380 (Utah 1980) this Court held 
that the award of attorneys' fees must rest on a basis of evi-
dence of need and reasonableness. 7his Court remanded a lower 
court's award of attorneys' fees with the following statement: 
At no point in the proceedings was any evidence 
addressed to whether or not plaintiff would be unable 
to cover the costs of litigation; indeed, no sugges-
tion was made by her that she would not be in a better 
position than defendant, in light of the substantial 
property settlement, to furnish counsel with compen-
sation. Id. at 1384. 
Without burdening this Court with a repetition of the inco~ 
of the parties as has been discussed previously, the evidence 
shows that Pat in 1979 and 1980 had a higher gross income 
than did Rainer. The figures previouslj listed do not 
take into account the additional income which innurs to her 
benefit from the income of the three houses awarded to her by 
the lower court. Nor does it take into account the asset value 
of these houses. 
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If this Court affirms the award of the Harmony Court and 
215 Iowa Street to the defendant she will have an increase of 
her net income of approximately $400 to $500 a month (resulting 
in a net loss of this amount to Rainer) . In addition, the value 
of these houses based upon the 1980 appraisal by Defendant's 
own appraiser is in excess of $54,000. 
Even if this Court reverses the award of the Harmony Court 
and 215 Iowa Streets to Defendant and merely affirms the award 
of the 224 Iowa Street property Pat would still be receiving 
a net gain of some $250 a month to her income with an asset 
valued by her appraiser at $31,400. 
The lower court failed to make sufficient findings to jus-
tify an award of attorneys' fees. While it is true that Defendant 
was required to retain the services of an attorney to defend 
the action brought by Plaintiff and to prosecute her own counter-
claim, it is equally true that Plaintiff was required to retain 
the services of an attorney for the same reasons. This finding 
hardly satisfies the requirement established by this Court that 
she is unable to pay her own attorneys' fees. 
District Court Judge Durham in a hearing for visitation, 
refused to award attorneys' fees to the defendant since both 
parties were gainfully employed and were earning sufficient 
income. (Tr. 832). This conclusion is correct based upon the 
evidence now before this Court. 
In addition, it is impossible to know what basis the lower 
court awarded any attorneys' fees since the defendant requested 
$9,000 in her testimony. Again, a quotation from the Kerr case 
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is appropriate: 
Neither does the evidence reflect any attempt 
to characterize the requested award as reasonable. 
Testimony regarding the necessi t:,' of the number of 
house dedicated, the reasonableness of the rate 
charged in light of the difficulty of the case, and 
the result accomplished, and the rates commonly 
charged for divorce actions in the community is 
conspicuously absent. 610 P.2d at 1384-1385. 
Plaintiff Rainer Huck contended that much of the attorneys' 
fees generated in this case was caused by the actions of defendant 
and her attorney. First, Defendant failed to leave the residence 
on Windsor Street at Plaintiff's request even though the house 
had belonged to Plaintiff prior to the marriage and even though 
she had specifically waived any interest in it in the premarital 
agreement. Three separate hearings were required to finally have 
Mrs. Huck vacate the premises. 
Second, in the beginning of the litigation Pat made a 
claim as to all property which was owned by her husband regard-
less of when it was acquired and regardless of the prenuptial 
agreement. It was therefore necessary to conduct discovery as 
to premarital assets as well as post-marital assets until the 
time that Judge Rigtrup in August of 1980 segregated the premarit 
properties from disoute. (R. 261). 
Finally, a substantial amount of time occurred because of 
the defendant's motion to disqualify Plaintiff's attorney. Wh1h 
Mr. Sandack stated that he did not include this time in his 
hours, the fact remains that Plaintiff's attorney was required 
to invest substantial time in defense of this motion which was 
much greater than the $250 awarded as attorneys' fees by Judge 
Rigtrup. 
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In fact, Judge Rigtrup in his Minute Order dated June 24, 
1980 correctly characterized this litigation: 
The court recognizes that more time and effort 
may have been expended in these efforts, but concludes 
that based on the circumstances of the respective 
parties and considering the antagonism and feelings 
generated in this case between the parties over this 
issue as well as other issues, that much unnecessary 
time has been invested in this case which may not be 
fully recognized in the award of fees reckoned on a 
purely economic basis. (R. 326). 
For these reasons, therefore, the lower court's award of 
$2,750 to Defendant as attorneys' fees should be vacated. 
POINT III. 
THE LOWER COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL 
ERROR IN AWARDING DEFENDANT WIFE THE 
PROPERTIES LOCATED AT 629 HARMONY COURT 
AND 215 IOWA STREET. 
In formulating the distribution of property in a marriage 
the court must endeavor to provide a just and equitable adjust-
ment of economic resources so that the parties might reconstruct 
their lives on a happy and useful basis. Searle v. Searle, 522 
P.2d 697 (Utah 1974). The same factors which are examined in 
the award of alimony are also examined in the distribution of 
property. MacDonald v. MacDonald, 236 P.2d 1066 (Utah 1951). 
This Court has recognized fifteen separate factors to be 
utilized in the division of property. Applying these factors 
to the instant case reveals the following: 
1. The social Position and standard of living 
of each before marriage. Defendant Pat Huck had been 
married, was a widow, a graduate student, and was living 
on an income of $300 a month at the time of the marriage. 
Plaintiff Rainer Huck had not been married, had acquired 
several properties, and was living at the Windsor Street 
residence which had been completely paid off. 
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2. The respective ages of the parties. Mr. Huck 
was 28 at the time of the marriage while Mrs. Huck was 
33. 
3. What each may have given up for the marriage. 
Neither party gave up anything for the marriaae since 
each pursued their own independent career. 
4. What money or property each brought into the 
marriage. Defendant had a $4,500 mortgage credit and 
$8,000 cash from the settlement of the estate of her 
deceased husband. Rainer had all or half interest in 
nine rental properties plus $15,000 in cash or personal 
belongings. 
5. The relative ability, training and education 
of the parties. Pat had a master's degree and was a 
certified medical technologist with several years work 
experience prior to the marriage. She was a Ph.D. 
candidate from 1970 through 1978. Rainer had a B.S. 
degree in electrical engineering and obtained a Ph.D. 
in electrical engineering. 
6. The physical and mental health of the parties. 
At the time of the marriage both parties were in good 
physical and mental health. 
7. The time of duration of the marriage. The 
time of the marriage to the time of the separation was 
almost exactly four years. From the time of the marriage 
until Pat's lawyer sent Rainer a letter stating that a 
divorce was being litigated was three years. (Ex. 3P) . 
8. The present income of the parties and the oropert 
acquired during the marriage and owned either jointly or 
by each now. Pat grossed approximately $17,000 in 1979 
excluding child support payments. Her gross income in 
1980 was in excess of $18,000 and involved a 32-hour work 
week. Pat retained all of her personal property includinq 
most of the furniture from the house. She has presently 
been awarded three additional properties with a rental 
income of approximately $500 a month. Rainer arossed 
$14,000 in 1979, had substantially the same income in 
1980 and receives all of his income from the rental houses 
which he owned prior to the marriage or acquired during 
the marriage. 
9. How it was acquired and the efforts of each in 
doing so. It is undisputed that all of the houses, ··1itl1 
the exception of 224 Iowa Street, were acquired solely 
by Rainer in his own name. It is also undisputed that 
Rainer did all the physical work of restoration ~nd 
maintenance in the properties. Except for the 22~ Iowa 
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Street, all of the down payments used to purchase these 
properties came from Rainer's premarital funds, from 
funds advanced by his partner, or from funds lent to 
him by his father. The only dispute in the record is 
whether Pat assisted in the rental of these properties 
during the marriage. 
10. Children reared, their present ages, and 
obligations to them or help which may in some instances 
be expected. There is one female child of this marriage 
who is now eight years old, in good health with normal 
needs. 
11. The present mental and physical health of the 
parties. Pat is presently in good health and was in 
good health at the time of the hearing. Rainer is 
presently in good health. 
12. The present age and life expectancy of the 
parties. Pat is 42 years old with a life expectancy 
of approximately 30 years. Rainer is 37 years old with 
a life expectancy of approximately 31 years. 
13. The happiness and pleasure, or lack of it, 
experienced during marriage. It is generally conceded 
by both parties that the marriage was unhappy from its 
inception and the parties agreed that were it not for the 
pregnancy of Pat no marriage would have occurred. 
14. Any extraordinary sacrifice, devotion or care 
which may have been given to the spouse or others, such 
as mother, father, etc. and obligations to other dependents 
having a secondary right to support. No such care was 
given in this case. 
15. The present standard of living and needs of each 
including the cost of living. At the time of trial the 
defendant was living in California on Balboa Island at a 
monthly rent of $650. Plaintiff is not aware of the present 
monthly rent she is now paying. A review of the exhibits 
offered by Defendant shows that after the marriage her 
standard of living is as high if not higher than when she 
was living with Plaintiff. Her cost of living is higher 
because of the area in which she has herself chosen to 
move. Plaintiff, on the other hand, maintains the same 
standard of living he had prior to the marriage and at 
the time of the marriage with the exception that he has 
incurred loans for payment of real estate taxes which 
have depleted his expendible income per month. 
This Court in the MacDonald case also stated the standard 
for review. This Court stated: 
-31-
It is true, as plaintiff maintains, that this 
Court has announced the doctrine that in divorce 
cases it will weigh the evidence and may substitute 
its judgment for that of the trial court. Neverthe-
less, this Court should not do so lightly, nor merely 
because its judgment may differ from that of the 
trial court. We adhere to the qualifications set 
forth in the more recent expressions of this Court: 
that the judgment will not be disturbed unless the 
evidence clearly perponderates against the findings 
of the trial court; or there has been a plain abuse 
of discretion; or where a manifest in]ustice or 
inequity is wrought. Id. at 1068. (Citations in 
original opinion omittedf. 
Plaintiff contends that applying all of these standards 
to the instant case shows that the lower court abused its dis-
cretion or comrnitted manifest injustice or inequity by awardina 
to Defendant the rental houses located on Harmony Court and 
215 Iowa Street. 
This contention is based upon two separate arguments. 
First, as pertaining specifically to the Harmony Court property 
the evidence is undisputed that Mr. Huck purchased this property 
with his premarital funds and that the house was thereafter 
self-supporting. Second, as to all properties including Harmony 
Court and 215 Iowa Street the conduct of Defendant estops her 
from now making any claim to an interest in them. These argu-
ments will now be discussed. 
A. Because of the Source of Funds Used 
to Acquire the Rental Property at 
629 Harmony Court was Premarital Funds 
the Lower Court Committed Error in 
Awarding it to Defendant. 
The property at 629 Harmony Court was purchased on June 9, 
1975 by Rainer at the purchase price of $11,000. It was there-
fore purchased two months after the marriage. $3,000 was 
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utilized as the down payment. This money was withdrawn from 
Plaintiff's savings account which contained premarital funds. 
(Tr. 507, Ex. 5, Ex. 6). 
After the Harmony Court property was acquired it became 
self-sustaining in that the rental income paid for any mortgage 
payments and other expenses required to maintain the property. 
(Tr. 519). 
The fact that Fainer utilized his premarital savings to 
purchase a house rather than keeping the funds in a bank account 
should have had no effect upon the distribution of this asset 
to Plaintiff. In other words, the asset existed through no 
effort on Plaintiff's part and she should not now be rewarded 
by his prudent investment. 
The New Jersey Supreme Court stated the applicable rule of 
tracing premarital assets as follows: 
Clearly, any property owned by a husband or wife 
at the time of marriage will remain the separate property 
of such spouse and in the event of divorce will not 
qualify as an asset eligible for distribution. We also 
hold that if such property, owned at the time of the 
marriage, later increases in value, such increment 
enjoys a like immunity. Furthermore, the income or 
other usufruct derived from such property, as well as 
any asset for which the original property may be 
exchanged or into which it, or the proceeds of its 
sale, may be traceable, shall similarly be considered 
the separate property of the particular spouse. Painter 
v. Painter, 320 A.2d 484 (N.J. 1974) (Emphasis added). 
Likewise the Supreme Court of Main in Young v. Young, 329 
A. 2d 386 (Me. 1974) held that furniture which was purchased 
with premarital money was exempt from marital distribution as 
long as the furniture was traceable and c0uld be attributable 
to the premarital funds. 
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The Supreme Court of Colorado in Gaskie v. Gaskie, 534 
P.2d 629 (Colo. 1975) reversed the findings of a lower court 
which awarded a portion of a ranch which had previously been 
owned by the wife prior to marriage. The lower court considerec 
the increased value of the ranch in distributing various other 
marital assets to the husband. The Supreme Court of Colorado 
reversed the lower court's determination and noted that the 
evidence showed the following: 
(1) Since reaching the age of majority, she 
personally managed the ranch and all dealings have 
been done in her name alone. 
(2) Her intent was that the ranch remain her 
separate property and its title to her alone. 
(3) The ranch under her management showed a 
profit and was never in danger of loss to a mortgage 
foreclosure or tax sale and her husband's contribu-
tions were never used to prevent the loss of the 
property. 
(4) All financing was solely in her name and 
with her funds including full payment of the mort-
gage. 
(5) All proceeds from the condemnation were 
kept in a separate ranch account. 
(6) Only she was involved in the complicated 
legal affairs of the ranch. 
(7) A quiet title action to the property was 
prosecuted in her name alone. 
(8) The husband's pattern of non-involvement in 
the ranch was attested to by disinterested third party 
witnesses. 
The court then made the following statement: 
In summary, five volumes of evidence, and even 
considering it in the best possible light for John 
Gaskie, compels our conclusion that his efforts did 
not contribute to enhancing the value of the wife's 
property. He made occasional and minute contribu-
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tions, which we will not allow to turn into a bonanza. 
For any participation in the management of this land, 
the husband was adequately compensated by the income 
or benefits received therefrom. Larrabee v. Larrabee, 
31 Colo. App. 493, 504 P.2d 358 (1972). 
It is manifestly against the weight of the evidence 
to conclude that through the parties course of dealings 
with the ranch it somehow lost its separate identity 
as the wife's sole property and merged into a family 
asset. Nor can we conclude that through the husband's 
efforts and earning capacity the wife was able to 
retain the ranch, whereas without him she would have 
lost it. Therefore we hold it a matter of law that 
the wife's ranch property, its apputenant water rights, 
and the condemnation proceeds shall not be included in 
the marital estate to be shared by John Gaskie. Id. 
at 632. (Emphasis added). 
Just as in Gaskie, Rainer purchased and maintained the 
Harmony Court property with no type of assistance from Pat. 
He received no benefit to this property in any way by being 
married. 
This Court has also recognized that equity will require that 
each party to a divorce action recover the separate property he 
or she brought into the marriage. In Preston v. Preston, 646 
P.2d 705 (Utah 1982) this Court reversed an order in which the 
lower court abused its discretion in failing to credit a husband 
for out-of-pocket expenses he utilized in purchasing a recrea-
tional cabin when the money came from the sale of assets he had 
owned prior to the marriage. 
The lower court in awarding Mrs. Huck the Harmony Street 
property when no effort on her part contributed to its initial 
acquisition or its continued maintenance. As is obvious from 
the record, ~his marriage occurred only because of the pregnancy 
of the plaintiff and was sustained as a matter of convenience 
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to both parties. From 1975 through 1978 Pat Huck continued 
as a full time graduate student pursuing her own independent 
career. 
It is obvious that had Rainer retained a 9 to 5 Job, Pat 
could not now make a claim for the premarital savings account 
had he elected to merely keep it in the bank. The fact that 
he chose to use this money to purchase an asset which was also 
income producing should not be considered since to do so penalizf 
him for the prudent use of his own assets. 
As stated by Judge Durham "A trial court considers many 
factors in making a property settlement in a divorce action, 
but the settlement should not be such ·that one party is damaged 
or punished." Warren v. Warren, 655 P.2d 684, 689 (Utah 1982 
(Durham, J. dissenting). 
B. The Evidence Introduced at Trial 
Clearly Preponderates in Favor of 
Plaintiff's Assertion that Defendant 
Should be Estopped from Making Any 
Claim as to the Rental Properties 
Purchased After Marriage. 
The facts in this case are clearly unique. The parties 
uniformly agree that Rainer did not wish to marry Pat and did 
so only upon her extreme pressure and upon his desire to 
financially assist her while she was attending graduate school 
and raising a young child. 
The circumstances surrounding the s1qn1n0 of the prenuot1a 
agreement from the testimony of defendant herself clearl; illu• 
trate che animosity and explosive circumstances surround1nu the 
marriage. 
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It was the contention of Rainer throughout the trial that 
Pat had represented to him prior to marriage and during the 
course of the marriage that if he would marry her, help 
support her during her education, and help assist in the 
raising of the child, that she would make no financial claim 
against any assets he acquired during the marriage. Plaintiff 
argued to the lower court that his support of Pat and the child 
enabling her to attend graduate school for some three and a half 
years together with the award of the jointly owned 224 Iowa 
Street property and the requirement of child support was adequate 
compensation for a four-year marriage of convenience. 
The lower court in awarding the property at 629 Harmony 
court and 215 Iowa Street rejected this estoppel argument thereby 
giving to Pat, according to her own appraiser, additional pro-
perty worth over $54,000. 
To reject Plaintiff's argwnent of estoppel the lower court 
had to disregard the following evidence: 
(1) The testimony of Plaintiff Rainer Huck; 
(2) The testimony of his parents Erna and Herman 
Huck; 
(3) The complete uniqueness which the parties 
treated the Joint purchase of 224 Iowa Street; 
(4) The tape recorded admissions made by Pat to 
Stan Secor as to her statements throughout the marriage 
to Rainer. 
While it is true that the testimony of Rainer and his 
parents can be disregarded as self-serving, this evidence 
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together with the undisputed evidence as to the Iowa Street 
acquisition and the tape recorded admissions of Pat clearly 
show that the elements of estoppel are present and that the 
lower court erred in failing to apply this doctrine. 
This Court in Hunter v. Hunter, 669 P.2d 430 (Utah 1983) 
made the following observations concerning doctrine of estopoel 
in divorce cases. This Court stated: 
Estoppel is a doctrine which precludes parties 
from asserting their rights when their actions or 
conduct render it inequitable to allow them to assert 
those rights. 
The doctrine of estoppel has been set forth 
by this Court as follows: 
The doctrine of estoppel has application 
when one, by his actions, representations, or 
conduct, or by his silence when he ought to 
speak, induces another to believe certain 
facts exist and such other relies thereon to 
his detriment. Leaver v. Grose, Utah, 610 
P.2d 1362, 1364 (1980) (Citations omitted). 
The common element of the doctrines of waiver 
and estoppel is the requirement of action or con-
duct by the person against whom the doctrines are 
asserted. Id. at 430. 
In a case involving a claim of estoppel as to payment of 
alimony, this Court stated the requirements which must be shOl"n: 
In order to prevail on his theory of estoppel, 
plaintiff must prove that defendant, by her repre-
sentations or actions led plaintiff to believe he 
need not pay alimony or child support, and that 
plaintiff, in reliance on said representations, 
changed his position to his detriment. In such a 
case, enforcement of the decree creates a hardship 
and an injustice to plaintiff, and defendant would 
be estopped to deny her own misrepresentations, 
and estopped from claiming unpaid support. Ross ·1_:_ 
Ross, 592 P.2d 600 (Utah 1979). 
There is no question but that the doctrine of estonpel is 
applicable to this case. The evidence is 0•1ervhclm1n" that 
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Pat repeatedly told the plaintiff that she would make no claim 
for any properties he acquired during the marriage. It should 
be borne in mind that the houses which were purchased by Rainer 
were all in condition which required substantial renovation. 
Rainer, therefore, had to expend a considerable amount of 
his labor as well as his money in making these properties a rent-
able investment. 
It would have been foolhardy for Rainer to spend substan-
tial amounts of time, labor, and money on these properties in 
a marriage which was admittedly never happy while his wife 
attended the University of Utah seeking a professional degree 
for her own betterment. Had not Rainer believed that she 
would not be making a claim as to the asset value of these 
properties after they were renovated. 
The following evidence clearly and decisively shows that 
Rainer's claim of Pat's representations are correct and that 
the lower court completely ignored the overwhelming evidence 
in the record. The following is a synopsis of this evidence. 
1. Testimony of Plaintiff. 
(a) Rainer testified that Pat pleaded with him to give her 
a try. She told him that she could make a good wife for him 
and assist him in his career goals so they could work together 
harmoniously. She told him that if the marriage did not work 
out at least the child would have a good start. She told him 
the alternative was for her to commit suicide. (Tr. 455). 
It was agreed prior to the marriage that should the marriage 
end in divorce she would make no claims as to the pre-existing 
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properties in any way. (Tr. 462). 
(b) Within the first week or two of the marr1aae Pat 
told him that because of the prenuptial agree1'1ent she would 
have nothing to do with any of the properties listed there and 
wanted nothing to do with any of his rental activities. She 
told him she would keep all of her money and her income to 
herself and that he should do the same. 
(c) It is undisputed that separate accounts were main-
tained by both parties and that a division of expenses was 
maintained by both parties. Although Pat claimed that Rainer 
had written checks on the joint checking account she failed to 
produce a single check in which this had occurred. 
(d) All of the properties purchased in 1975, 1976 and 197-
were purchased in Rainer's own name or in conjunction with his 
partner Craig Cook. None of the documents relating to the title. 
liens, or encumbrances in any way show the name of Pat Huck. 
(Ex. 23). 
(e) In 1976 Pat announced she was very unhapoy in the 
marriage and that she intended to get a divorce as soon as ste 
completed her education. (Tr. 468). She said she wanted to 
continue the present arrangement because it would be much 
easier for her to continue her education and that she could 
perform her research and teach her classes without having to 
wor~y about having her own household. (Tr. 469) 
(f) In 1977 the state of the marriage was the same. Pat 
frequently expressed her intent to obt~in a di.orce. The 
marriage was in a process of moving apart and there ~ere proble~' 
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in many areas that were solved by doing less and less together. 
Pat was still engaged in her shoal work at the time and was 
working at sporatic hours. (Tr. 476). 
(g) In 1977 Pat became unhappy because she saw Rainer 
doing quite well with the rental properties and wanted to 
participate. This was around June of 1977. She told him she 
would be willing to do the necessary work that was required if 
he would buy a property with her. They sutsequently bought the 
224 Iowa Street property together which will be discussed 
infra. (Tr. 477-478). 
(h) In April of 1978 Rainer received a letter from Wally 
Sandack informing him that his wife was going to obtain a divorce 
and seeking Rainer's presence to discuss the division of property. 
After confronting Pat about his meeting with Sandack, and informing 
her that she was breaking their previous agreement, she denied 
this and said she would stand by the previous agreement and would 
not attempt to acquire any of his assets. She asked him to wait 
until her examinations were over in July before discussing divorce 
further. (Tr. 490). Pat specifically and frequently said she 
wanted nothing to do with the rental places. When occasionally 
a renter would bring his rent over in person she would complain 
about the "scuzzy" tenants coming into the house. She would also 
complain about the phones ringing during vacancies. (Tr. 580) 
(i) On rebuttal, Rainer testified that while his wife 
stated on her examination that she always considered half of 
the properties to be hers, that this was not what was told to 
him during the course of the marriage. (Tr. 778). 
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{j) As he acquired each property she continued to make th~ 
same representations that she was not interested in them and 
wanted nothing to do with them. Rainer stated he relied uoon 
these representations in his continuation of acquiring and 
renovating these properties. (Tr. 779). 
{k) Rainer testified that had she not made these state-
ments he would have done things differently. He would either 
have asked for a new agreement after the marriage or would have 
required her to sign a quit claim deed at the time each pro-
perty was purchased. (Tr. 780). 
2. Testimony of Erna and Herman Huck. 
(a) Erna Huck, Rainer's mother, stated that about one year 
after the marriage Pat said she couldn't get along with Rainer 
and it was better that they separate. She told her that she 
wouldn't need anything from Rainer and that she would finish 
her school and go her separate way. (Tr. 766). Erna Huck 
testified that throughout the marriage Pat would periodically 
say that she could not stand to be married any longer and wante~ 
a separation. (Tr. 767). 
(b) During the time that she made these statements about 
getting out of the marriage Erna Huck was astounded how easily 
Pat would make them. She was not mad or upset during the con-
versations and just said that she had her or0fess1on and didn't 
need anything from anybody. (Tr. 773). 
(c) Herman Huck, Rainer's father, stcited that after ?at 3: 
Rainer were married for about a year she suJJenl~ t0lrl h1rn, to 
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his astonishment, that she wanted a divorce. She told him they 
were not getting along very well and that she wanted a divorce. 
She said it would be good if the marriage did not last any 
longer and that she could find another husband and Rainer 
could find another wife. (Tr. 753). She told Mr. Huck that 
she was going to finish her schooling and that she had a pro-
fession of her own and didn't need Rainer to support her. She 
said she could do that herself and that she didn't wany anything 
from him. She said that since she didn't bring anything into 
the marriage she wasn't expecting anything out of it. (Tr. 754). 
3. The Joint Purchase of the 224 Iowa Street 
Property. 
(a) In 1977 Pat and Rainer Huck purchased a property 
located at 224 Iowa Street. Pat paid approximately $6,600 as 
part of the down payment. Rainer received his half from his 
father, a debt for which he is still liable. (Tr. 478). 
(b) The title to this particular house was listed as 
"Rainer Huck and Pat Huck, tenants in common." (Ex. 5). Only 
on this house of all the houses acquired during the marriage 
did Rainer keep a separate ledger as to the expenses incurred 
in order that Pat, as an equal partner, would share the expenses 
and benefits from the pro=its. (Ex. 20). On October 27, 1977 
a check was written from Rainer to Pat with the notation "224 
to 10/27.177." This was an amount owing to her as reflected 
(Ex. 19, Tr. 784). 
(c) Periodic accounting payments for the property were made 
to Pat on October 27, 1977, December 12, 1977, January 28, 1978, 
f'ebtucir'.· ::'8, 1978, March 28, 1978, and December 26, 1978. (Ex. 25) 
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(d) Pat denied that the Iowa Street property was any 
different from any of the others. She could not explain, howe~ 
why Iowa Street was the only one held jointly and why she had 
specifically paid $7,000 in cash to the seller of that house. 
(Tr. 669-673). 
(e) Pat was completely unable to explain why Rainer would 
give her money on a regular basis as to the 224 Iowa Street 
property and not the others. She also admitted that the list 
of expenses which he kept was showed to her as her share of 
the profits from the property. (Tr. 715) . 
(f) Pat admitted that she did actual physical work at the 
224 Iowa Street property but did not perform any other labor at 
any of the other rental houses. (Tr. 674). She claims she did 
this because when they bought it it was in bad shape and needed 
to be fixed. However, she admitted that all the houses that 
Rainer bought were also in bad shape but she did not assist in 
their repair. (Tr. 6 74-6 75). 
4. Tape Recorded Admissions of Pat. 
(a) During several telephone conversations which were 
recorded by Rainer, Pat told Stan Secor, Rainer's real estate 
agent, that she represented to Rainer throughout the marriage 
that she was making no claim on his property and 
that the Iowa Street property was a joint partnership. These 
pertinent conversations verbatim are as follows: 
Like I alwavs told Rainer before, if this d1dn't 
work out, which there was a gooc chance it wouldn't, 
that I would just walk with what I had but he oi3ses 
me off so bad today you know . (Tr. 6591 
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Yeah, well, I don't know. I think, you know, 
considering that I thought that I would be satisfied 
with nothing, you know, anything I get would be some-
thing, you know. Buy my lawyer said he thought Rainer 
would be responsible until I finish school and every-
thing that he would have to support me and Sophie. 
(Tr. 660). 
So anyway I told him I'll pay you. Don't you 
think that's fair? I mean, I told him what do you 
want me to do? What can I do? I asked if there is 
something I can do, and he said no, and I said if 
you hate me doing it so much, pay a plumber. Well, 
you can have all my profits for the rest of the year 
and he is just hassling me about it, you know. What 
can I do? (Tr. 675). (Emphasis added). 
Pat did not deny the substance of these conversations 
which occurred in April of 1978. They fully support the testi-
mony of Rainer, his parents, and the documentation as to the 
Iowa Street property that Pat repeatedly told him that she was 
making no claim on any of his property and that only the 224 
Iowa Street property was considered by her as a partnership. 
Plaintiff fully agrees with the principle that it is proper 
for a wife to receive half of the rewards of the joint marriage 
effort. However, the evidence in this case is patently clear 
that there was never any joint effort made by Rainer and 
Pat. Rather, each person pursued their own independent pur-
suits: he renovating rental properties for the purpose of 
supplying an income for his scientific research and she attending 
the University to obtain a graduate degree. 
The error in the trial court's ruling is even more apparent 
if it were assumed that Pat had in fact obtained a Ph.D. in 
1978 and was now making a salary of $60,000 a year. It is doubtful 
that any court would award Rainer any property settlerrent on the 
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theory that he assisted her in obtainina her e,iuc1tion ar.d 
therefore is entitled to some of the proceeds of her labor. 
It is equally incredulous that she should expect to share in 
his labors in the acquisition of these rental properties. 
This marriage is unique. It did not involve youngsters 
who shared their early days together and helped each other in 
acquiring assets. The marriage did not involve parties who 
stayed together for 20 or 30 years in building and maintaining 
a family and property. Rather, this was a strained marriage to 
say the least where each party conducted their lives, as much 
as possible, on an individual basis. There was no joint effort, 
there was no joint sacrifice, and there should, therefore, be 
no joint division. 
The lower court clearly abused its discretion and ignored 
the clear preponderance of the evidence in awarding Pat the 
house located at Harmony Court and 215 Iowa Street. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant appreciates the difficulty of any court in 
partitioning the assets of a married couple after the failure 
of the marriage. Appellant also acknowledges that the dis-
tribution made by the trial court would be fair and equitable 
to another couple with normal circumstances of rnarriaue. 
However, the facts and circumstances of this marriace are 
far from normal. The decision to become married was hard!; 3 
joyous event for either party. 
more or less pursued their own lives--he reno\·atiri.; nental 
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properties and performing scientific research; she pursuing 
her Ph.D. and later working as a lab technician. The finances 
of each party were separately maintained, the expenses divided, 
and their activities were individual. 
The only joint bond of the parties was their daughter 
Sophie. Both Rainer and Pat helped and contributed to her 
early development. Because of Sophie, Rainer does not bemoan 
this marriage in any way. He only seeks a fair award based on 
the facts of the marriage and not based upon a normal, traditional 
marriage where both parties were true partners. 
The prenuptial agreement was a binding legal document and 
must be enforced. The evidence shows that, at the time of 
separation, Pat was capable of "self support." The award of 
$1,800 temporary alimony should be vacated. 
There is likewise no evidence that Pat is unable to pay 
her own attorney fees especially if the present profit distribu-
tion is upheld. This award of $2750 should also be vacated. 
Finally, the distribution of the Harmony and 215 Iowa 
Street property to Pat is improper since Rainer's premarital 
funds purchased the one house and Pat should be equitably 
estopped from making any claims as to any rental house separately 
acquired by Rainer. The award should be vacated. 
Respectfully submitted, 
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